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AEROFLOT, THE SOVIET AIRLINE -
AT HOME AND ABROAD
By HARRIETT E. PORCHt
I. INTRODUCTION
A LTHOUGH the Cold War is still being waged on many fronts, plans
for a Moscow-New York air route are once again under discussion
between the Soviet Union and the United States. Najeeb Halaby, United
States Federal Aviation Administrator, has stated that service could begin
on this route as early as summer 1964 if all technical arrangements proceed
smoothly. If completed, this agreement would add the most prestigious of
all routes to the burgeoning network of the Soviet carrier, Aeroflot.
In the field of international aviation, one of the recurrent questions is
that of the potential competition between the Soviet carrier and those
of the West. This brief paper presents some current data on Aeroflot's
organization and operations and describes the role of civil aviation in the
USSR; it also discusses some of the political and competitive implications
of the Soviet carrier for United States aviation interests.
II. AVIATION IN THE ECONOMY OF THE USSR
A. Need For Aviation
Unless one is a student of geography, the vastness of the USSR is seldom
realized. The Soviet Union covers between a sixth and a seventh of the
total land surface of the world. It is more than twice as big as any other
country and is three times as large as the United States. The distance be-
tween its northern and southern frontiers is over 3,000 miles and double
that distance from east to west.
Forty-seven per cent of the USSR is permafrost or permanently frozen
subsoil. Building highways and railroads over much of this area remains
uneconomical and, in some cases, still impossible. Only in recent years have
technological advances permitted much headway against problems related
to development of permafrost areas,' therefore, air transportation is gen-
erally relied on to serve these areas.
In addition to geographic and distribution factors, the time differential
between air and surface transportation in the Soviet Union is an important
factor that was evident even in the early days of air service. For example,
in 1929, the time between Moscow and Irkutsk, in Eastern Russia, a
distance of 2,625 miles, was reported to be thirty-six hours by air and
six days by surface transportation.! It was seen that air transportation
could ease the burden of the surface carriers by absorbing passenger,
freight, and express services to the new population centers.
t B.S.B.A., M.B.A., University of Denver; United Air Lines, Safety Department, 1953-1958,
Link Training (Jan.-May), 1959; Aeroquip Corp., 1959-1960; Planning Research Corp., 1960-
1961; The RAND Corp., 1961-present; University of Southern Calif., Lecturer in Air Transporta-
tion, 1961-1962.
'Hunter, Soviet Transportation Policy 5 (1957).
2 Aeroflot, Red Star into the West, Air Transport Association Memorandum, Washington, D.C.
(1958) p. 4.
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B. Airline Development
The first airline in the USSR was a joint German-Russian carrier estab-
lished in 1921. Three other airlines were started in 1923, but a general
airline reorganization in 1930 merged all three into one carrier, Dobroflot.
Two years later the name was changed to Transaviatsia. The responsibili-
ties of this carrier were broadened and it was placed under the admin-
istration of the Chief Administration of the Civil Air Fleet. In 1933,
Glavsevmorputi, Administration of the Northern Sea Route, was set up
to furnish air and sea service on the Northern and Arctic routes. In 1934,
Aeroflot, the name of the present state-owned air carrier, became the sur-
viving carrier, under the Chief Administration of the Civil Air Fleet
(GUGVF). The Northern Sea Route carrier continued as a separate en-
tity, however, until 1960, when it also came under GUGVF.
The USSR is one of the few major governments that does not belong
to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) nor does Aero-
flot belong to the International Air Transport Association (IATA). Aero-
flot claims to conduct its services and operations according to almost the
same standards set forth by ICAO and IATA, especially on international
flights. During the 1960 visit to the United States, the Soviet Aviation
Delegation said that the USSR had no intention of joining either ICAO or
IATA. Upon invitations extended by these organizations, the Russians
sometimes send observers to their meetings.
III. ORGANIZATION OF AEROFLOT
The Aeroflot organization is a complex one due, in part, to a tremendous
scope of activities and in part to the inherent complexities of the Soviet
governmental system.
A. Chief Administration Of The Civil Air Fleet
The Chief Administration of the Civil Air Fleet (GUGVF) is charged
with the legal and administrative responsibility for all civil aviation. The
GUGVF reports directly to the Council of Ministers, the highest execu-
tive body of the Soviet Government, and the apex of the organizational
pyramid of Soviet industry. The Central Board of the GUGVF is presently
headed by Col. Gen. Ye F. Loginov, former chief of the Soviet Air Force.
Reporting directly to General Loginov is the Chief Inspector who super-
vises airworthiness certificates and enforces centrally agreed standards in
every civil aviation field. Subordinate to Loginov are four Deputy Chiefs
who have under them fourteen Directorates, much like the vice-presidents
of a United States air carrier. These directorates are assisted by six service
departments: Planning; Labor and Wages; Finance; Publications; Supply;
and a Technical Department.
1. Territorial and Regional Air Groups Under the administration of the
GUGVF are some twenty-six territorial and regional air groups (although
this total number is not agreed upon in aviation sources) collectively re-
ferred to as the Civil Air Fleet (GVF). The groups are divided into opera-
tional units, each responsible for the actual conduct of air transport
operations within its territory. Assisting the GVF are four line-service de-
partments: Research, Communications, Inspection, and Construction.
The complexity of such an organization creates management and eco-
nomic problems which no doubt affect the over-all efficiency of the airline.
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Such conflicts can be seen in a statement made by Col. Gen. G. S. Schet-
chikov, Aeroflot's First Deputy Chief: "One of our contractors is the
Ministry of Transport Construction. Its plans sometimes disagree with
ours. Because of this, misunderstandings often arise and a vast amount of
unnecessary correspondence is carried out."'
The problems in the GVF are also compounded by this involute organi-
zation. For example, the territorial groups have been urged to boost load
factors by advertising Aeroflot's services. The Yalta Chief complained that
although there was an illuminated restaurant sign on the Aeroflot Agency
building, the air group did not have illuminated signs of their own be-
cause the subdivision directors underestimate the importance of advertising
and never allocate funds for it.4
Each territorial administration, while supported by GUGVF, must ac-
count for all of its operating expenses, both direct and indirect, and must
report on all its income, such as fares, cargo shipments, charges to col-
lective farms for agriculture work, and maintenance done for other
territories. Thus, the day-to-day operation of the airline is left to the
territorial and regional groups while the fundamental airline management
problems of through routes, size of fleet, fares, labor force, and so forth
are handled by the main administration. While truck routes and fares are
decided in Moscow, the territories each initiate and operate their own local
routes on their own schedules and set their own fares for those routes.
Airport management is a separate department under GVF. Each airport
maintains its own financial account and is responsible for all air and ground
facilities at the airport, including air traffic control, ground services, traffic
and sales, line maintenance, and support facilities. The airport commander
may carry a rank as high as Deputy Chief of the territorial administra-
tion. At larger airports, there are often as many as four commanders, with
responsibilities divided between air traffic control, maintenance, airport
buildings and grounds, and commercial traffic and sales.
2. Northern Sea Route The Chief Administration of the Northern Sea
Route (GUSMP) formerly operated its own airline, Aviaarktika, or Polar
Aviation, over the Arctic routes. Early in 1960, however, Polar Aviation
personnel and equipment were transferred to Aeroflot and the unit be-
came known as the Directorate of Polar Aviation, headed by General M.
I. Shevelev. All of Aeroflot's Arctic routes are now flown by this group.
B. Responsibilities Of The Airline
Soviet civil aviation not only differs from that of other countries in
organization but also in functions and responsibilities. In addition to being
a domestic and international carrier, Aeroflot also has the responsibility
for some sixty services, including agricultural and forestry services,
ambulance service, geologic surveying, sea rescues, weather reporting, and
locating schools of fish for the fishing fleets. Actually, anything in the
aeronautic field that is not directly connected with the military is under
the jurisdiction of Aeroflot. The airline is responsible for civil plane
maintenance, the development and maintenance of airways and naviga-
tional aids, and the building and maintenance of airports, runways, and
terminals. It must train air and ground crews and assist with the thousands
3Aviation Week, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 44.
'American Aviation Daily, Oct. 23, 1958 international, p. 137.
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of flying clubs throughout Russia. To finance these numerous responsi-
bilities, Aeroflot has its own budget, provided first by gross revenue, and
second by direct grants from the government budget for the purchase of
equipment.
IV. FLIGHT EQUIPMENT
The development of an air carrier's route system depends on the kinds
of aircraft available to it and the performance of that equipment. It is
estimated that Aeroflot has 200 to 300 jet planes, 400 turboprop planes,
and some 1,400 piston planes, including training and experimental air-
craft, and that it has supersonic aircraft under development. In addition,
Aeroflot has an extensive fleet of helicopters for carrying passengers on
short local hauls and for a variety of general utility airwork.
A. Propeller-Driven Aircraft
The service flights, such as ambulance and flying doctor, photography,
remote-area supply, and agriculture and forestry crop dusting and seeding,
are generally flown with small single-engine and twin-engine planes as
well as with helicopters. Many of these aircraft can be equipped with skis
or floats for special purposes. Larger twin-engined planes are used for
passenger transport on the short- and medium-length routes. Among the
most widely used propeller-driven planes in the USSR today are the 11-12,
11-14, An-2, and An-14.
B. Jet Aircraft
Aeroflot introduced the Tupolev Tu-104 twin-jet into scheduled service
in 1956, thus becoming the first international airline to use pure jets.
Although a number are still in service, the basic design proved to be highly
uneconomical. It has undergone two major modifications, designated the
Tu-104A and Tu-104B. Tupolev later designed the Tu-124, a smaller
version of the Tu-104, but equipped with improved engines.
C. Turboprop Aircraft
One of the first turboprops in the Soviet Union was the An-8, designed
by Oleg Antonov's Design Bureau primarily for cargo work. Out of this
basic design have come the larger An-10 and An-10A transports. These
models are finding some success as export items for they were designed with
the unimproved airfield in mind. A forthcoming version, the An-16, will
be longer and will seat more passengers than the An-10. Out of the same
Design Bureau is the twin turboprop An-24, placed in regular service in
November 1962. The high-wing transport is being used on short- and
medium-haul routes of 800 to 1,000 miles and, together with the Tu-124
jet, will replace the aging propeller-driven Il-12s and Il-14s.
The Iluyshin Design Bureau produced the four-engine 11-18, also for
use on unimproved airfields. It was put into scheduled service in April
1959 and now serves at least forty-five of Aeroflot's routes. A modified
11-18, the 11-181, with greater payload and fuel capacity, is also in
service.
The largest turboprop transport in service in the world today is the
Tupolev Tu-114, a passenger conversion of the "Bear" bomber. Powered
by four turboprop engines with eight contrarotating propellers, the
Tu-114 can carry up to 220 passengers at approximately 500 mph. It
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was designed for long, nonstop routes, and is not economical on routes
under 2,700 miles in length. This plane was used to fly Premier Khrushchev
and his party on an official visit to Washington in September 1959.
The clumsiness of this plane can be visualized from the fact that the
runways at Washington National Airport were too short to handle the
Tu-114 and the landing was made at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.
Mr. Khrushchev had to leave the plane on the runway because the taxiway
leading to the parking area was too narrow for the plane's main landing
gear. As at most United States airports, the taxiway at Andrews is fifty
feet wide, but the distance between the outer wheels of the Tu-114 is
forty-nine feet six inches. Special boarding stairs had to be constructed
at Andrews as conventional United States equipment was five feet short
of reaching the cabin door.
Aeroflot plans to use the Tu-114 on the new Moscow-New York route
until 1966 when it will use its new 11-62, a long-range aircraft with rear-
mounted turbojet engines (similar to the British Vickers VC-10). This
aircraft, now undergoing test flights, will be put into scheduled domestic
service in the USSR in 1965. It will be capable of carrying 182 passengers
at speeds of 559-621 mph over distances of 8,000 to 11,000 miles nonstop.
D. Forthcoming Aircraft
A good deal of Aeroflot's growth potential and position among the
world's airlines depends upon future equipment. In addition to the 11-62,
Paris and Eastern Satellite newspapers have recently carried reports of
a supersonic transport being developed by the Antonov Design Bureau.
The design speed of this aircraft is said to be Mach 2.2 to 2.7, with a
range of 1620 to 2160 nautical miles.
Reports are also currently circulating that the USSR is contemplating
a supersonic transport that will use a booster aircraft or a multistage
rocket for takeoff and acceleration to cruise speed. Fuel savings would
enable the combination to be twenty-five per cent lighter than a trans-
port with only a single-stage engine.' According to Yuri Gagarin, pro-
ponents of the rocket-plane say it will travel at speeds of about 15,000
mph and is "intended for intercontinental transport of a large number
of people and valuable freight."'
The Soviets are known to have been working on a nuclear-powered air-
plane. A limited number of writings on such aircraft appeared in Soviet
literature from 1957 to 1959, and schematic drawings by Russian scientists
of nuclear-powered turboprop and ramjet aircraft appeared in Aviation
Week in 1959.' Little information has appeared in public literature since
then.
V. ROUTE SYSTEM
Aeroflot's international and domestic route structure and its accumu-
lated mileage (62,100 international and about 248,400 domestic) is
impressive from the point of sheer magnitude. However, total route miles
without corresponding frequency schedules do not give a representative
picture of an airline's operations.
'National Aeronautics, July 1961, p. 16.
" Aviation Week, April 23, 1962, p. 27. Reports on interview with Soviet Cosmonaut Gagarin.
Butz, Soviets Study Nuclear Plane Concepts, Aviation Week, July 13, 1959, p. 65.
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The frequency of each international flight varies from one to six times
a week depending on the season and the political atmosphere. Domestic
flight frequencies are even more varied, from once a week on the Polar
and Siberian routes, to several times a day on the heavily traveled Moscow
to Leningrad route.
A. International Routes
At the end of 1963, Aeroflot listed service to thirty countries outside
the borders of the USSR, including ten within the Communist Bloc
Virtually all of Aeroflot's scheduled service to points outside the Com-
munist Bloc-Western Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa-has
begun within the past six years. Twenty-one foreign airlines now fly into
Moscow.
Although the hoped-for routes to the United States and Brazil did not
materialize in 1963, regular service was inaugurated between Moscow and
Havana, Cuba. Aeroflot plans a major expansion of its international routes
by 1965 (the end of the present Plan period), including North and South
America, and further expansion in Africa.
Aeroflot has already had informal discussions with both Canadian and
Brazilian airline executives regarding Aeroflot services into those countries.
And, as previously mentioned, discussions about a Moscow-New York
route are currently underway.!
Red China's success in obtaining an air route to Pakistan, with con-
comitant access to the Arabian Sea and, potentially, Africa's east coast,
has lent new urgency to Russia's drive for more African services. There is
little doubt that Red China will aggressively seek landing rights on
Africa's east coast, where Peking's influence is increasingly in sharp
competition with Moscow's."
The USSR is well aware that it occupies an 'enviable geographic posi-
tion astride the shortest great circle routes between Western Europe and
Asia. Soviet tactics in negotiating international air agreements reveal the
firm intention of developing Moscow as a universal air traffic hub.
B. Domestic Routes
The first purely domestic flight in Russia-from Moscow to Nizhny
Novgorod (now Gorkiy)-was inaugurated in the summer of 1923. By
1929 this fledgling 260-mile route was part of an 11,500-mile network.
In the 1930's, the route system was expanded to most of the major cities
in the western part of the Soviet Union so that by 1939 it totalled 83,893
miles. Further development was delayed by World War II, and route
expansion did not resume until the fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950).
As early as 1952 the Soviet domestic route system totalled 109,500
miles. In the following years, new services were opened in the Far North,
the Far East, Siberia, and Central Asia, the Ukraine, the Baltic Republic,
and Kazakhstan. The operation of jet and turboprop equipment made
further route expansion feasible and the total domestic route mileage is
now 248,400 miles.
The structure of the domestic route network is roughly as follows:
1. The Main Trans-Siberian Route crosses the Soviet Union from west to
8Flights to Tirana, Albania were discontinued in 1961.
9 Talks, begun in 1958, were stepped up in 1961. An agreement was near completion when the
talks were discontinued in 1962 because of tensions over the Berlin situation.
"°Aviation Week, Oct. 7, 1963, p. 121.
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east. Starting at Moscow it goes due east to Irkutsk and Khabarovsk. There
the route splits, going south to Vladivostok and northeast to Magadan and
the Kamchatka Peninsula. There are now several nonstop turboprop flights
from Moscow to Khabarovsk as well as jet and piston flights with stops at
major cities along the route. These cities connect with dozens of inde-
pendent routes.
2. The Far Northern Route extends from Moscow to extreme northeastern
Siberia. Parallel routes have been set up to allow alternate routing in the
case of adverse weather. This northernmost route is the longest in the
Soviet Union, extending from Moscow to the Chukotski Peninsula (across
the Bering Strait from Alaska) via Tiksi, a port city on the Laptev Sea.
3. The Main Routes From Moscow to the Fourteen Capital Cities of the
Other Republics go direct to Kiev, Minsk, Erevan, Baku, Tblisi, Ashkabad,
Tashkent, Stalinabad, Alma Ata, Frunze, Kishinev, Vilnius, Riga, and
Tallinn.1
4. Local Routes to Regional Centers or Larger Settlements are mainly
feeder services operated by the territorial administrations. Most of these
routes are concentrated in the heavily populated areas south of Moscow.
5. Helicopter Routes are becoming an important item in the domestic
airline system. Aeroflot claims it has 200 scheduled helicopter routes in
operation totalling 7,500 route miles. However, many of the "schedules"
are flown only when the traffic warrants it. The most extensive helicopter
service is in the Moscow area where ten to twelve trips daily are made
from downtown to all three airports. In addition, Aeroflot has two-hour
sightseeing flights over Moscow on Sundays.12 Helicopters are also popular
in the vacation areas of the Crimea and along the Caucus Black Sea.
Another major helicopter hub is the Azerbaidzhan capital of Baku on the
Caspian Sea .
VI. AIRLINE OPERATIONS
Now that we have looked at some of Aeroflot's responsibilities, let us
turn to the airline operations themselves.
A. Advertising
Although Aeroflot tried to follow the Marxist precept of supplying a
volume of output or of service just sufficient to meet the needs of con-
sumption, it found, beginning about 1958, that there were signs of excess
capacity. A modest advertising campaign was started, including posters
and postcards. But special investigating teams of the Komsomol (Young
Communist League) found that the advertising messages were not getting
across to the public. Results of a poll taken late in 1960 showed that many
Moscow citizens had only a vague idea of the services offered by Aeroflot.
At one railway station, people were taking the train to Irkutsk in central
Siberia because they were unaware of air transport's time advantage. Most
train passengers had no idea of airline fares or the amount of baggage that
can be carried free. Others thought planes seldom flew during the late
fall and winter, and many were unaware that buses operate to all Moscow
airports.13 Still other reasons for not using the airlines were the lack of
" Bashkirov, Air Routes in the Soviet Union, Interavia, 2/1960, pp. 211-213.
1Aviation Week, July 9, 1962, p. 34.
"3 Aviation Week, Jan. 2, 1961, p. 34.
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money and the fear of flying. Since this survey, a stepped-up advertising
campaign has included vacation brochures, gayly colored posters and
postcards, promotions, and fare cutting.
B. Passenger Services
Aeroflot's reservation system is much like that used in the United
States a number of years ago, utilizing telephone, radio, and telegraph
systems. No electronic data-gathering or computing equipment is pres-
ently in use. Tickets are sold at airports, at the downtown terminals, in
hotels, at railroad stations, through the Soviet travel agency, Intourist, and
by Aeroflot agencies throughout the USSR. Tickets may be ordered by
telephone and delivered to the purchaser's home or business address.
Although flight schedules are not at times most convenient to the
traveler, Aeroflot does try to compensate for layovers. When a passenger
must wait for a connecting flight, the airline furnishes free food and
lodging at the airport for twenty-four hours. In case of an airline delay,
foreign-bound passengers get three meals a day and lodging until the
flight is ready to depart. The free baggage allowance on domestic flights
has recently been increased from forty-four pounds to seventy-nine
pounds, which is the same allowance granted by the Soviet railroads."
Westerners traveling in the USSR have reported a number of poor pro-
cedures in passenger handling, and even the Soviet passenger has much
to say on this subject. Letters to the editors in newspapers and magazines,
and blistering editorials indicate shortcomings in Aeroflot's passenger
service. There are often instances of unwarranted cancellations and post-
ponements of regular flights, errors in scheduling, and a lack of coopera-
tion between territories, especially in weather reporting. A number of
airports do not have enough hotels to accommodate passengers in transit,
although the current building programs at major airports have improved
the situation somewhat. Ground transportation to the airports is often
poor, and information services do not always have current data on flights
and are seldom operated in a courteous manner."
Aeroflot personnel attending Russia's Tenth Congress of the Union of
Aviation Workers in Moscow in May 1962 were sharply criticized for
paying too little attention to improving the quality of passenger service.
They were told that "every fourth passenger plane departed late or was
delayed enroute during 1961," and that almost 1200 passengers took a
variety of complaints of poor service directly to Aeroflot's top adminis-
tration.16
Airport equipment, however, is rapidly being improved, and much of
the makeshift ground equipment is being phased out. Power-operated load-
ing stands, baggage carts, fork lifts, and belt loaders are becoming
standard equipment at the larger airports, but the smaller airports still
have to rely on a great deal of manual labor in the handling of cargo and
baggage. Fueling and fire-fighting equipment at only a few of the air-
ports are up to Western standards. Airports equipped for jet operations
have airport cleaning equipment, rotary snow ploughs, and hot air blowers
for ice removal.
14Aviation Week, Sept. 10, 1962, p. 120.
15 An article criticizing the operations at Kiev said that due to poor management, the airport
workers are experiencing "zhniva," a Ukrainian term meaning "hour of hardship, stress, and pres-
sure." Vladiminov, Behind Average Figures, Grazhdanskaya Aviatsiya, Oct. 1958, p. 31.
'"Aviation Week, May 21, 1962, p. 43.
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C. Operating Statistics
A thorough statistical study of Aeroflot's operations is extremely diffi-
cult because of a dearth of necessary information. Until the last few
years, freight, mail, and passenger traffic figures were cloaked in vague
percentage gains without absolute base-year figures. In an attempt to gain
some idea of the growth of the airline, Table I presents some published
figures dating back to the beginning of the airline system in Russia. Be-
cause of the heterogeniety of the sources employed and the possible in-
accuracy of many of the figures, the emphasis here is on growth trend
rather than on absolute numbers.
TABLE I**
AEROFLOT OPERATING STATISTICS, SELECTED YEARS, 1922-1962
Total Mail
Number of Air Mail Freight and Freight
Yeara Route Miles Passengers (tons)b (tons)b (tons)b
1922 746 276 * - 15
1927 4,363 7,079 11 11 137
1932 19,779 27,200 530 550 1,080
1937 64,629 211,800 11,087 44,352 55,439
1947 93,210 1,500,000 - 119,000 -
1950 149,757 2,000,000f 15,500t 130,000t 145,500t
1955 195,902t 2,500,000 63,800 - -
1958 - 8,300,000 87,800 357,800 445,600
1959 - 12,200,000 97,900 446,400 544,300
1960 - 16,200,000 150,700 545,800 696,500
1961 297,800 21,800,000 195,600 647,300 842,900
1962 - 27,000,000 - - -
* Not available.
a Figures for 1922-37 appear to be beginning-of-the-year figures; other years give end-of-the-year
figures.
b In short tons. One short ton equals 0.9072 metric tons.
t Estimates based on percentage comparisons.
** Sources: The Aeroplane and Commercial Aviation News, March 22, 1962, p. 4;
Browne, Aeroflot, Soviet Civil Aviation, Society of Automotive Engi-
neers, SAE preprint S-235, March 30, 1960; Commercial Yearbook of
the Soviet Union (1925-1930 Moscow), Passim; Economic Handbook
of the Soviet Union, pp. 73-75 (1931); Rizika, 20 J. Air L. & Com.
127-139 (1953); van Zandt (ed.), World Aviation Annual, p. 501
(1948); Velizhev, Forty Years of Soviet Aviation (Moscow, 1958, Series
IV, Nos. 37-38), pp. 34-36, 44-45.
Because of the variety of Aeroflot's services, and because its statistics
are not broken down by type of service, comparison of size with that of
other airlines might be misleading. For example, the number of passengers
carried may include not only those carried by scheduled airplanes and
helicopters but also those carried by air taxi, air ambulance, and other
nonscheduled flights.
On the occasion of Aeroflot's fortieth anniversary, Gen. Loginov, head
of the airline, published an article in Pravda in March 1963, stating that
during the first four years (1959-1962) of the Seven-Year Plan, 77
million passengers had been carried: 27 million in 1962, 21.8 in 1961, 16.0
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in 1960, and 12.2 in 1959."' The goal of 30 million passengers for 1962
was missed by a wide margin and is blamed on excess capacity, poor
weather, and the delay of getting the 11-62 turbojet into passenger opera-
tions to help increase long-range traffic. Aeroflot fell short of its 1962 cargo
and mail goals by an even wider margin than it missed its passenger target.
In the Russian Republic, which has more than half of the USSR's popula-
tion and over 75 per cent of its area, the Soviet airline's cargo tonnage
increased only 10 per cent in 1962 and mail tonnage rose only 2 per cent.
Total 1962 and 1963 figures for all Republics are not available as yet, al-
though 1962 figures were said to be "almost a million metric tons."" Nine-
teen per cent more passengers and 8 per cent more cargo were carried
during the first half of 1963 than in the same 1962 period. A 19 per cent
passenger gain, if maintained during all of 1963, would bring the yearly
total to about 32 million, still short of the goal of 35 million passengers.
However, an increase in tourist traffic in the summer and fall may have
boosted this earlier estimate. Aeroflot's target for 1965 is 50 million pas-
sengers (United States estimates are 100 million passengers), and the
long-range goal is 200 million passengers annually by 1980. For a rough
comparison of size between Aeroflot and the consolidated United States
scheduled airlines, Table II presents figures on number of passengers
carried, passenger miles flown, and ton-miles of freight carried by Aero-
flot and by the United States airlines.
TABLE IIt
COMPARISON OF AEROFLOT AND U.S. SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS,
1955-1961
(in thousands)
Aeroflot U.S. Scheduled Air Carriers
Number of Passenger- Freight Number of Passenger- Freight
Year Passengers miles ton-miles* Passengers miles ton-miles*
1955 2,500 1,738,800 172,500 38,025 24,351,000 434,279
1956 3,200t 1,925,100 210,000 46,005 27,624,800 503,967
1957 5,400t 2,794,500 232,560 49,421 31,260,800 553,794
1958 8,200 3,974,400 273,500 49,169 31,499,400 550,468
1959 12,200 5,651,100 300,500 55,999 36,371,800 646,143
1960 16,200 7,514,100 385,000 57,876 38,862,800 702,808
1961 22,000 10,184,400 448,431 58,441 39,827,300 794,113
1962 27,000 n.a. n.a. 62,480 43,757,971 968,060
* Although not explicitly stated in the sources, Aeroflot figures probably include express; there-
fore, express figures have been included in U.S. figures. Mail is excluded.
t Estimates.
t Sources: Col. (1): Compiled from Western and Soviet news releases; Col.
(2): Central Statistical Administration, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu
(National Economy of the USSR 1961) (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1962), pp. 473,
475; Col. (3): 1955-1956, 1958-1960, The Aeroplane and Commercial Aviation
News, March 22, 1962, p. 4; 1957 and 1961, same source as Col. (2); Cols.
(4)- (6): Facts and Figures about U.S. Transportation (Washington, D.C.: Air
Transport Association of America, 1962 and 1963), pp. 1, 15, 23.
17 Compared with the major portion of world traffic, the ninety-eight members of ICAO (of
which Aeroflot is not a member) carried 111 million passengers in 1961 and 123 million in 1962
in scheduled service. See Interavia, 4/1963, p. 483.
" Aviation Week, Feb. 25, 1963, p. 52.
"'Aviation Week, Aug. 5, 1963, p. 52.
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One must use extreme care with these figures, however, in comparing
growth trends. To make accurate predictions, a more complete breakdown
would be needed of the Soviet figures. In the event, for example, that
Soviet figures include nonscheduled flight statistics, the bias will be on
the low side of the United States, for only scheduled air carrier statistics
are included here. Adding figures for private, pleasure, business, agricul-
tural, and nonmilitary government flying would swell United States
figures tremendously.
Aeroflot's growth, especially since 1959, has permitted substantial
economies through increased traffic volume. Along with this increased
traffic volume and increased performance, there has been an 80 per cent
jump in capital investment. Between 1963 and 1965, more than 50 per cent
of Aeroflot's capital investment is earmarked for acquisition of aircraft
and helicopters that were not in commercial service in mid-1962. By 1965,
73 per cent of the carrier's total capital investment will be in aircraft,
compared with 63 per cent in 1959. Soviet economists see the need for
stricter supervision of this large financial outlay. They want the money
used in a manner that will permit the government to reduce significantly
the period required to recoup its capital investment in commercial avia-
20tion.
D. Maintenance
Routine line maintenance and partial overhaul are done at the airport
maintenance shops but complete overhaul and major repair work are the
province of special independent plants.'
The organization of the airport shops and the independent shops is
similar. There is a "preparation" department where inspections are made
and tasks allotted to maintenance crews. A "major overhaul" department
takes care of engine changes and regulation 100- and 200-hour over-
hauls. The "operational maintenance" department deals with routine pre-
flight and after-flight maintenance and fifty-hour checks. The "auxiliary"
department inspects, repairs, and prepares the galleys and other aircraft
installations. The "instrument maintenance" department looks after the
maintenance and overhaul of removable items and special equipment.'
E. Safety
Unlike most Western carriers, Aeroflot does not have a separate safety
department. Instead, all matters relating to safety are the responsibility
of the Chief Inspector of the GUGVF. What few safety statistics 3 that
are available are not in a form to permit comparison of Soviet data with
those of Western carriers or even between Russian Territorial Admini-
strations.
Safety procedures in the air seem to be totally inadequate as far as pas-
senger safety is concerned. Safety belts are installed on all planes that
fly international routes, but are not on all planes used for domestic routes.
Emergency exits (if they exist) on Soviet aircraft are not marked,
2"Aviation Week, March 11, 1963, pp. 178-179.
21Malyuga, Aeroflot's Technical Services, Interavia, 2/1960, p. 214.
22Ibid.
23 For example, number of accidents, severity, fatalities, number of man-days lost due to illness
or accident, kind and amount of damage to equipment, and so on, have never been published by
Aeroflot.
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neither are any inertia flashlights 4 mounted in the cabins nor any exit-
to-ground slides for emergency egress. No life vests or belts are carried
on over-water flights. Safety drills or instructions are not given to the
passengers, even about the use of oxygen face masks that are provided
on the jets and some of the turboprops. Aircraft engines are equipped
with Bendix-type fire-warning systems and CO extinguishing systems
not much different from those found on United States equipment. The
engine installation, however, is not generally provided with stainless steel
or titanium cowlings or fairings at heat-sensitive points. In case of engine
fire, chances of the fire spreading to the wing and exploding the fuel are
therefore much higher than if equipment were properly protected."5
No exact figures are available on Aeroflot's safety record. From 1927
until 1958, Aeroflot did not make public any airline accident-a fact that
does much to make the record look better than it actually is. For more
recent years only limited information on Aeroflot accidents and their
causes is available."'
VII. POLITICAL AND COMPETITIVE IMPLICATIONS
Aeroflot's acknowledged desire is to become the world's largest interna-
tional carrier, but much of its growth to date can be attributed to the
growing international interests of the USSR. The Soviet Government has
encouraged an enlarged Aeroflot role in international aviation if for no
other reason than to have it more nearly commensurate with the position
of the USSR as a world power. The major objective of Soviet air expansion
is to impress the underdeveloped countries with new Soviet modernism in
technology and benevolence in diplomacy, using aviation as a symbol.
This diplomacy has embraced such acts as favorable prices and terms of
payments for the purchase of Soviet aircraft, reciprocal air agreements,
and technical aviation assistance projects. These means are sought to en-
hance Soviet prestige and possibly alienate the newly emerging countries
from their Western association. It must be remembered that to these new
countries the possession of civil aircraft and of operating civil airlines,
especially in international service, is part of the almost fanatic nationalism
and an index of political achievement.
A. Export Of Aircraft And Aviation Aid
Although the USSR has carried on a very active sales campaign for the
export of Soviet aircraft, especially the 11-18 and An-10 turboprops, and
the Tu-104 turbojet, it has met with only marginal success. The Tu-104
now has diminished prestige value because of criticism, both from inside
and outside the USSR, of its low utilization, excessive ton-mile costs, and
high depreciation.
Ghana has been the largest purchaser of Soviet equipment, now owning
eight Il-12's and one An-12 (a version of the An-10). A total of twenty
24 Inertia flashlights, usually attached to cabin bulkheads, turn on when the plane receives a jolt
-such as gear-up landing. They supply the cabin with light when the main power supply is cut ofF.
"5 Letter to the author from Hans Heymann, Jr., Dec. 14, 1961. Mr. Heymann was a member
of the United States Aviation Delegation that toured Aeroflot facilities in September 1960.
"Twelve accidents, seven of them fatal, are known to have happened to scheduled Aeroflot
flights. Few details are known about the causes, number of injuries, fatalities, etc. The latest crash
occurred July 13, 1963, when an Aeroflot Tu-104 crashed while attempting a landing at Irkutsk.
The dead included the Albanian ambassador to Communist China.
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II-18's have been sold to the airlines of the African countries, and
Communist China purchased an undisclosed number of 11-18's in 1960.
The purchase price of Soviet aircraft are understood to sometimes be lower
than prices of Western equipment and the USSR offers extremely attrac-
tive financial arrangements. However, Soviet equipment has not been
economical to operate and Western equipment is still preferred. The lack
of Soviet success in selling its transports has been due primarily to in-
adequacies in the aircraft, which have caused excessive overhaul and main-
tenance costs to their purchasers. But also to blame are basic deficiencies
in Soviet policies on engine overhauls and operating economy.
Western assistance would be preferred if countries were considering
equipment alone (our better equipment, maintenance, spare parts, experi-
ence, reliability), but choices are not made on purely technical grounds.
In some countries, aid is sought and welcomed from almost any source,
especially if the source refrains from questioning the rationality of the
country's particular investment choice.
Most important, of course, the decision of whether to buy Soviet or
Western equipment, or whether to accept Soviet or Western aviation aid
is not a technical decision but a political one. It is a calculated choice by
a government, not based on an analysis of where it can obtain the most
satisfactory assistance.
B. Competitive Assets
Although Aeroflot does not presently offer much competition to United
States carriers, the Soviet Union claims to possess several impressive assets
with which it could become a major competitor. The validity of these
claims is examined below.
1. New Aircraft Adapted to Needs of Underdeveloped Countries Aeroflot
claims that the new Soviet aircraft now being introduced into service are
technically and commercially competitive with Western equipment. More-
over, the equipment is claimed to exhibit considerable design emphasis on
certain performance characteristics that have not been considered im-
portant in the West, namely the ability to utilize rough landing strips and
short runways.
As mentioned above, however, Western equipment has found worldwide
acceptance as being superior to Soviet equipment. Soviet equipment thus
far has not been economical or reliable to operate, and the newer equip-
ment is just being put into service in the Soviet Union so that its value
and operation is still to be seen. Furthermore, United States aircraft manu-
facturers are producing many types of aircraft suitable for use in un-
derdeveloped areas. This Soviet claim, then, can be branded as false.
2. Politically Attractive Techniques of Economic Aid The Soviet claim of
an attractive economic aid program seems to be true. The Soviet Union
has developed approaches and techniques that have evoked a most favor-
able political response in underdeveloped countries. It has proved itself
willing to grant long-term, low-interest credits requiring no recourse to
hard currencies and providing for redemption in the products of the
recipient country. By encouraging the development of indigenous talents,
by providing technical assistance designed especially to promote locally
independent national growth, and by carefully avoiding ownership par-
ticipation (as opposed to methods used in the Bloc countries), Soviet
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assistance has been carefully conceived and channeled to produce long-
range consequences favorable to the achievement of Soviet political
objectives.
While the popular impression of successful Soviet aviation assistance
and export programs is not borne out by the facts, the Soviet economic
aid effort is impressive because of the finesse with which it is implemented.
The widening focus of the Soviet effort to embrace promising targets
such as new aviation routes, its emphasis on symbols of technological
modernism such as its large aircraft, and its clever exploitation of existing
political and economic frictions contribute to making the Soviet carrier
part of a political gambit in the influence-building contest between the
United States and the USSR.
3. Freedom to Set Tariffs Because Aeroflot does not belong to IATA it
can make unilaterial decision on what passenger fares and cargo tariffs
to charge. However, Aeroflot's bilateral and pooling agreements with
other airlines should serve to restrict any desire to undercut international
fares. Aeroflot has generally followed international rates, but should it
attempt to set its rates below a competitor's at any time, direct govern-
mental embargoes and sanctions would no doubt be imposed. As Aero-
flot is working toward acceptance as a world carrier, there is little likeli-
hood of its making unilateral reductions in fares or tariffs.
VIII. SUMMARY
As we have seen, Aeroflot has grown into a strong carrier and a modest
competitor to Western carriers. Aeroflot is an important part of the
USSR economy by virtue of its position as a prime inter-city passenger
carrier in the over-all Soviet transportation system. It also functions
as an element in Soviet foreign relations through its participation in for-
eign trade and assistance programs. In these ways it serves as an effective
economic and political tool to further Soviet worldwide aims. The USSR's
continued development will be reflected in a concomitant growth in the
status of Aeroflot. In turn, Aeroflot has become an important element in
the Soviet strategy aimed at promoting this development.
Given the determination of the Soviets to exploit aviation aid and
assistance programs consistently over a period of years so as to enhance
the Soviet political power position and to undermine that of the West,
it becomes imperative for the United States to review all of its own
aviation policies, both internal and external. We must have a strong
aviation industry with adequate programs in exports, technical assistance,
and bilateral agreements. Our aviation policies and programs must be
designed to protect and advance our own national interests as well as to
assist other countries in forming strong aviation transport systems for
use in over-all economic development.
'7 Heymann, Future Prospects for Soviet Economic Aid, The RAND Corporation, P-1269, Jan.
31, 19S8.
